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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the economic performance of Norwegian crop farms using
a stochastic frontier analysis.
Design/methodology/approach – The analysis was based on a translog cost function and unbalanced
farm-level panel data for 1991–2013 from 455 Norwegian farms specialized in crop production in eastern and
central regions of Norway.
Findings – The results of the analysis show that the mean efficiency was about 78–81 percent. Farm
management practices and socioeconomic factors were shown to significantly affect the economic
performance of Norwegian crop farms.
Research limitations/implications – Farmers are getting different types of support from the government
and the study does not account for the different effects of different kinds of subsidy on cost efficiency.
Different subsidies might have different effects on farm performance. To get more informative and useful
results, it would be necessary to repeat the analysis with less aggregated data on subsidy payments.
Practical implications – One implication for farmers (and their advisers) is that many of them are less
efficient than the estimated benchmark (best performing farms). Thus, those lagging behind the best
performing farms need to look at the way they are operating and to seek out ways to save costs or increase
crop production. Perhaps there are things for lagging farmers to learn from their more productive farming
neighbors. For instance, those farmers not practicing crop rotation might be well advised to try that practice.
Social implications – For both taxpayers and consumers, one implication is that the contributions they pay
that go to subsidize farmers appear to bring some benefits in terms of more efficient production that, in turn,
increase the supply of some foods so possibly making food prices more affordable.
Originality/value – Unlike previous performance studies in the literature, the authors estimated farm-level
economic performance accounting for the contribution of both an important farm management practice and
selected socioeconomic factors. Good farm management practices, captured through crop rotation, land
tenure, government support and off-farm activities were found to have made a positive and statistically
significant contribution to reducing the cost of production on crop-producing farms in the Central and
Eastern regions of Norway.
Keywords Benchmarking, Cost function, Farm management, Farm performance
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The United Nation has predicted that current world population of 7.6bn is expected to
reach 8.6bn in 2030, 9.8bn in 2050 and 11.2bn in 2100 (United Nations, 2017). Finding a
way to meet the growing demand for food represents a major challenge for farmers,
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policymakers and agricultural researchers. These global challenges also affect Norway.
Increasing the quantity and quality of food in response to growing food demand requires
improvement in the performance of the agricultural sector. Agricultural production growth
in Norway is a topic of continuing interest to researchers and policymakers who aim to
improve the economic efficiency and economic sustainability of primary agriculture. Good
farm management and agronomic practices, in combination with efficient input use, are the
best ways to improve farm productivity. In this context, agronomic practices are steps
farms incorporate into their farm management to produce crop output. These steps include
land preparation, time of sowing, crop rotation, use of new crop varieties, pest control, etc.
While some practices may be designed to increase output, others may be directed to
reducing labor time or costs.
Farms use different farm management/agronomic practices and resource combinations
to produce crops. Thus, we can expect differences in performance between farms, with some
less efficient than others. Farm inefficiency can be defined as the extent to which farmers are
using more resources to produce a given level of output than the resources used by the best
practice farmers.
In recent years, several studies have used “benchmarking” techniques to examine the
efficiency in the agricultural sector (e.g. Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010; Koesling et al., 2008; Odeck,
2007; Flaten et al., 2010; Lien et al., 2010; Kumbhakar et al., 2014; Sipilainen et al., 2013).
“Benchmarking” is defined as a measurement of the quality of an organization’s policies,
products, programs, strategies, etc., in comparison with standard measurements, or with similar
measurements of its peers, see for detail Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Coelli et al. (2005).
The objectives of benchmarking are: to analyze how the more successful organizations achieve
their high-performance levels; to determine what and where improvements are called for; and to
use this information to improve performance. Measuring such efficiency gaps and identifying
the causes can be useful to both farmmanagers, taxpayers, consumers and to policymakers and
planners seeking to help farmers to improve their performance (Singh et al., 2016).
An investigator may not only be interested in the level of economic performance but also
might want to know which factors (exogenous variables) affect the level of farm
performances (Smith et al., 2006; Parmeter and Kumbhakar, 2014).
The ability of a farm manager to convert inputs into outputs via a given technology is often
influenced by “exogenous variables” that characterize the environment in which production
takes place (Coelli et al., 2005) (different names have been used in the economics literature for
exogenous variables, such as environmental variables, z-variables and determinants of
inefficiency). Thus, the accurate measurement of the economic performance of the crop farms
demands an understanding of differences in the working environment. The environmental
factors include farm-specific factors, such as management skill, institutional constraints and
attitude to risk, or innovations that are unmeasured but can be partially represented by
observable variables such as age, experience, participation in farm improvement programs and
education. Environmental variables can be expected to provide farmers with various types of
opportunities and challenges, which ultimately affect their level of farm performance.
In recent years, several studies have used benchmarking techniques to examine the level
and determinants of inefficiency in farming. For instance, Latruffe et al. (2004) analyzed the
technical efficiency and its determinants for individual farms specialized in crop and
livestock production in Poland. They reported that, on average, livestock farms are more
technically efficient than crop farms. Moreover, soil quality and the degree of market
integration proved to be important determinants of technical efficiency. Curtiss (2000)
investigated technical efficiency and competitiveness for Czech crop production for the
years 1996–1998 and reported that there was a high correlation between technical efficiency
and competitiveness. Moreover, market conditions, transaction costs in marketing and
bargaining power were positive determinants for competitiveness. Zhu and Lansink (2008)
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analyzed the impact of the CAP reforms on the technical efficiency of three crop-producing
EU countries in the period 1995–2004. They reported that the mean technical efficiency was
75 percent in the Netherlands, 70 percent in Sweden and 59 percent in Germany. The ratio of
crop subsidy to the total subsidy had a positive impact on the technical efficiency in the
Netherlands and Sweden, but no significant impact in Germany.
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) estimated technical efficiency and its determinants for
Norwegian grain farms for the period 2004–2008. They reported that resources were
sub-optimally used. Off-farm activity, direct subsidy and entrepreneurial orientation
were found to have negative effects on technical efficiency, while farm managers with more
experience were likely to be more efficient than those with fewer years of farm experience.
Lien et al. (2018) estimated technical efficiency of the Norwegian crop-producing farms
observed from 1993 to 2014 and reported that the mean technical efficiency was 0.82–0.88.
Moreover, off-farm work was found to decrease technical efficiency while direct subsidy
payments had a positive and statistically significant effect on technical efficiency.
Previous studies of agricultural efficiency have given useful insights into farm
performance. However, the contribution of farm management practices such as crop
rotation to the economic performance of crop farms remains unclear. This paper contributes
to the literature in a number of ways. First, we hypothesize that:
H1. In addition to commonly used efficiency determinants (land rent, off-farm activity
and direct government support), cost efficiency (CE) depends on the important farm
management/agronomy practice of crop rotation.
Second, unlike previous studies, which commonly estimated the technical efficiency of farms:
H2. We estimated the economic (cost) efficiency, which accounts for both the technical
and the allocative inefficiency of each farm.
A farm achieves technical efficiency when it is able to minimize the use of inputs to produce
a given amount of output so that no inputs are wasted. Allocative efficiency is achieved
when the farm is able to use its inputs according to their respective relative prices.
Measuring such CE gaps and identifying determinants can be useful to farm managers,
policymakers, planners and advisers seeking to help farmers to improve their performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the nature of Norwegian
agriculture. Section 3 addresses the approach to measuring farm performance, while
Section 4 discusses model specification. Section 5 includes a discussion of the data and
definitions of variables used in the cost function. Section 6 includes the results and
discussion thereof. Section 7 covers conclusions and implications.
2. The nature of agricultural production in Norway
Norwegian farms are usually small and family-operated. Only 3.3 percent of the total
Norwegian land area is farmland (Statistics Norway, 2013). Owing to the topography of the
country, fields are often small, scattered and difficult to cultivate, which contributes to
the high costs of agricultural production. With a relatively long winter in most parts of the
country and a short growing season ( five months on average), growing fodder, mainly
grass, has the comparative advantage in most parts of the country. On the other hand, long
summer days, with sufficient rainfall, are beneficial for crop production. Moreover, the cool
climate limits the spread of pests and diseases (Steinshamn et al., 2016).
The primary objectives of the Norwegian agricultural and food policies, as set out in the
White paper No. 11 (2016 –2017) are: long-term food self-sufficiency alongwith protection of the
environment; creatingmore added value; and maintenance of small-scale farming in all regions.
To achieve these objectives the government supports the farmers. The two main support
instruments used by the government are border protection measures to limit or exclude
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competing imports, and budgetary payments (subsidies). The budgetary support includes
market price support, special tax rules for agriculture, area payments, investment grants and
grants for research and extension services. Market price support for most commodities, in the
form of wholesale target prices, is provided. These target prices and most budgetary payments
are negotiated on an annual July/June basis between the government and representatives of the
two farmers’ unions (the Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders Union and the Norwegian
Farmers Union), resulting in an Agricultural Agreement. Despite the various support
measures, the value of support payments has been decreasing in real terms.
As in most developed countries, farming has become highly mechanized and the number
of farms has been declining, with production becoming concentrated on fewer farms.
According to Statistics Norway, the number of farms was 96,000 in 1991 and had declined to
42,000 in 2015. Moreover, 2.3 percent fewer farms were registered in 2016 compared to 2015.
The number of farms growing only crops decreased by 29 percent over the years 2006–2016
(Statistics Norway, 2013). However, according to the NIBIO (2016) farm account survey
report, the average size of farm holdings in 2015 was 37 ha, which was an increase of
8 percent compared to 2014. Moreover, the area of rented farmland has been increasing over
time, and the average area of rented land per farm reported in 2015 was 17 ha (NIBIO, 2016).
The structure of farms in Norway has been regulated by the Norwegian Concession Act.
Norwegian farmers face extensive farm policies which have effects on their choices of the
size and scale of the farm. For example, the Norwegian Agricultural Authority manages the
quantities produced of milk, meats, vegetables, potatoes, fruits and berries (Knutsen, 2007).
Limited access to land and capital restricts productivity changes, as does policy regulation
in the form of quantitative restrictions on milk supply.
Norwegian agriculture is so heavily subsidized that, without support, it would not be
competitive with imports. There is a threat that Norway may be obliged by international
pressures to cut back on border protection and on output-related subsidies. If that happened,
it would force a dramatic and painful shift toward a more competitive agriculture.
Therefore, there is a case to be made to take urgent steps to improve the productivity and
management of farming.
3. Approaches to measuring farm performance
There are two main benchmarking methods in the literature to measuring the performance
of farms: a parametric (econometric) approach, such as a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA);
and a non-parametric approach, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA). In both methods,
the basis for performance measurement is the radial contraction/expansion connecting
inefficient observed points representing individual firms with reference points on the
efficient frontier (There are other approaches too, for instance, Bayesian stochastic frontier
(SF) (Koop and Steel, 2001), semi-parametric (Simar and Wilson, 2007) and stochastic DEA
(Huang and Li, 2001), but these are not commonly used in empirical studies).
Based on a sample of producers, both the two main approaches involve estimating a
“best practice” frontier for a specific industry or sample of firms. Each approach has its pros
and cons. For details, see Coelli et al. (2005), Parmeter and Kumbhakar (2014) and
Kumbhakar et al. (2015). The treatment of measurement error is the critical distinction
between parametric and non-parametric approaches. SFA models can accommodate
stochastic noise, such as measurement errors due to weather, disease and pest infestation
that are likely to be significant in farming. The DEA approach is sensitive to outliers since
the measurement error is ignored (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005; Barnes et al., 2009). Since farms in
our study are sensitive to external random shocks, we have chosen the SFA approach to
evaluate the CE scores and determinants of inefficiency.
Depending on the nature of the data set at hand, there are two classes of SFA models. If
we have only one observation per farm, then a cross-sectional model has to be chosen to
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estimate the performance of each individual farm. A data set that consists of different farms
that are observed at different time periods is called a panel data set. A panel data set
contains more information, and therefore allows us to separate unobserved heterogeneity
( farm-specific effects) from inefficiency.
Since the introduction of the SFA model by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and
Van den Broeck (1977), there has been considerable research to extend the basic model,
creating a new subfield in econometrics. Different SFA models have been developed
based on different assumptions about the temporal behavior of the inefficiency.
Reviews of much of this research are provided by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000),
Coelli et al. (2005), Greene (2008) and Kumbhakar et al. (2015).
In addition to estimating CE for each crop farm, it is useful to learn about factors that
affect cost inefficiency between and within farms (Lien et al., 2018). The first SFA models
that dealt with modeling the impact of exogenous variables (z-variables) on the level of
inefficiency between and within farms are those of Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991). In these cross-sectional models, the variance of the
inefficiency term was specified as a function of a set of exogenous variables (z-variables).
Later, Wang (2002) introduced a further generalization in which both the mean and variance
of the inefficiency are functions of exogenous variables. For detailed reviews see Parmeter
and Kumbhakar (2014) and Lien et al. (2018).
Among panel data models, the inefficiency specification used by Battese and Coelli
(1995), commonly known as BC95, is frequently used in the empirical analysis of
performance studies (Parmeter and Kumbhakar, 2014). Using the BC95 model, a researcher
not only estimates the efficiency score, but also can investigate determinants of firm
inefficiency (exogenous variables) in a single-step procedure. It is also possible to estimate
the determinants of inefficiency in two steps, but that method creates biased results (Wang
and Schmidt, 2002). In the single-step procedure, the parameters of inefficiency and the
determinants are estimated together via maximum likelihood.
The general BC95 model for our panel data in a cost function form can be specified as:
ln Cit ¼ b0þ f yit ;wit ; bð Þþuit zit ; dð Þþ vit ; (1)
where ln Cit is the logarithm of actual costs incurred by farm i in time t; f( yit, wit; β), the
chosen function form (e.g. Cobb-Douglas, Translog); yit, a vector of outputs; wit, the vector of
input prices; and β , the vector of parameters to be estimated. The component vit is a
symmetric disturbance (error term) capturing the effects of noises that are beyond the
control of the farmers. The error term has both positive and negative effects, and satisfies
the classical assumptions, i.e., viidit N 0; s2v
 
; vit ? uit . Further, uit is a one-sided non-
negative term, accounting for inefficiency. In the BC95 model, uit is obtained by truncating
(at zero) the normal distribution, i.e., uit N þ ðmit ;s2uit Þ and μit ¼ zitδ,. zit is a vector that
includes exogenous variables associated with variability in the efficiency score and δ is an
unknown parameter to be estimated.
The CE is the ratio of the minimum cost of each farm (exp( f(yit, wit; β)+vit)) to its actual
cost (exp( f( yit, wit; β)+uit+vit)). i.e. CE ¼ exp(−uit). CE has a value between 0 and 1, with
1 defined a cost-efficient farm. Since only the sum of two error terms (εit¼ uit+vit) can be
observed, the farm’s cost inefficiency index can be estimated using the conditional mean of
the inefficiency term, as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982), i.e. E[uit/vit+uit].
4. Empirical model specification
Consistent with the farm efficiency literature (e.g. Christensen and Greene, 1976), we
estimated a transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost function incorporating Hicks-neutral
technology change. We used panel data but, to simplify the notation, we have dropped the
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subscripts i and t, where iwould denote firm i ¼ 1,…, n and twould denote time, t ¼ 1,…, t.
Our specification of the cost function C, including the prices of inputs (wj) j¼ 1,…, J, outputs
( yk) k ¼ 1,…,K, and a local wage distribution index (rm) m¼ 1,…,M, is:
ln C ¼ b0þ
XJ
j¼2
pj ln wjþ
XK
k¼1
bk ln ykþ
XM
m¼1
|m ln rmþdt t
þ
XK
k¼1
XJ
j¼1
pkj ln yk ln wjþ
1
2
XM
m¼1
XM
m¼1
|mm ln rm ln rm
þ1
2
XK
k¼1
XK
k¼1
bkk ln yk ln ykþ
XJ
j¼2
XJ
k¼2
bjj ln wj ln wjþdtt t2
" #
þ
XK
k¼1
XM
m¼1
bkm ln yk ln rmþ
XJ
j¼2
XM
m¼1
pjm ln wj ln rm
þ
XJ
j¼2
pjt t ln wjþ
XK
k¼1
bkt t ln ykþ
XM
m¼1
|mtt ln rmþe: (2)
The error terms ε splits into two components, i.e., ε≡vit+ui. As discussed in section 3 component
ui captures cost inefficiency with uit N þ ðmit ; s2uit Þ. vit is the error term capturing
random shocks and assumed to be symmetric and to satisfy the classical assumptions i.e.,
viidit Nð0; s2vÞ: All Greek letters are parameters to be estimated. The trend variable, t,
is included to capture technology change and starts with t ¼ 1 for 1991 and increases by
one annually.
Economic theory requires imposition of price homogeneity and symmetry
restrictions on the parameters. Symmetric restrictions require
PJ
j¼1pj ¼ 1, andP
kbkk ¼
P
jbjj ¼
P
m|mm ¼ 0. An easy way to impose price homogeneity is to divide
the all inputs prices and total cost by an arbitrary chosen input price. Thus, in Equation (2)
the left-hand side is re-defined as ln C¼ ln (C)/(w1), and all input prices are re-defined as ln
wj¼ ln (wj)/(w1), i.e., we divided all input prices and the total cost by wages before estimating
the translog cost function. Given the translog specification in (2), the farm-specific cost
inefficiency and marginal effects of the exogenous variables are calculated following the
procedures of Jondrow et al. (1982) and of Wang (2002), respectively.
As discussed above in Section 3, we included exogenous determinants of farm CE in our
model. The choice of variables in the final model was based on two criteria. First, we
considered data availability. Many variables that could affect crop management, such as
skill, education level, soil type and slope or aspect of the farmland, were not available in our
data set, so could not be included. Second, we considered the literature available on the
subject, for example, Latruffe et al. (2004), Bozoğlu, and Ceyhan (2007) and Lien et al. (2018).
As a result, we chose the following variables:
(1) Crop rotation (z1) – reflecting the impact of rotation system on crop and forage
production, measured as the ratio of non-cereal crops such as root and legume crops
to the total cropped area. We expected the farm managers’ decisions to rotate the
type of crop grown on the land would make a positive contribution to the
performance of their farms. Our expectation is in line with other research findings
that crop rotation reduces agriculture’s dependence on external inputs through
internal nutrient recycling, maintenance of the long-term productivity of the land
(Gebremedhin and Schwab, 1998). Crop rotation can improve the fertility of the soil
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(Reckling et al., 2015) and can increase yields to a higher degree than pesticide
intensity and tillage use (Deike et al., 2008).
(2) Land tenure (z2) – the proportion of the total farmland that is rented. Farm
managers’ decisions to rent land or not depend on the price of land and other factors.
We expected a positive contribution to this variable because we hypothesize that
well-performing farms more commonly rent extra land. Deininger and Byerlee (2011)
support our hypothesis and stressed that land rental markets can help transfers of
land from producers with low levels of productivity and low comparative advantage
in agriculture to more efficient farmers.
(3) Off-farm activity (z3) – the ratio of time of owner plus partner allocated to off-farm
activity to the total time assigned to the farm. We expected a positive contribution
from this variable on the basis that off-farm experience and income are likely to
promote better farm management. Our hypothesis is supported by the literature.
Off-farm income has been found to relax cash constraints and to allow farmers to
spend significantly more on improved farming technologies (e.g. Pfeiffer et al., 2009;
Stampini and Davis, 2009).
(4) Government support (z4) – the ratio of government assistance to the total agricultural
income. We hypothesized a positive contribution from this variable because
government support can motivate farm managers to invest in new technology and
may facilitate such investment by easing cash flow constraints. In line with our
hypothesis, there is evidence that government support helps to promote better use of
economic resources (e.g. Ferjani, 2008; Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010).
5. Data
Our data source is the Norwegian Farm Accountancy Survey collected by the Norwegian
Institute of Bioeconomy Research (NIBIO). The survey participants are selected from a list
of farmers, randomly drawn from the register of grants kept by the Norwegian Agricultural
Agency. The data include production and economic data collected annually by NIBIO from
about 1,000 farms in all regions of Norway. The number of participants varies from year to
year. Approximately 10 percent of the surveyed farms are replaced per year to incorporate
changes in the population of farms in Norway. Participation in the survey is voluntary.
There is no limit on the number of years a farm is included in the study. Some of the farmers
have participated in more than 20 years, and others have started participating for the first
time. To accommodate panel features in estimation, we included only those farms for which
at least three consecutive years of data are available.
To assess the efficiency and productivity growth, we needed to be sure that farmers
under consideration are comparable. To obtain a homogeneous group, we choose only farms
in the two main cropping areas where 98 percent of the cultivated land was located. Figure 1
shows that out of the 286,000 ha of land cultivated for grain and forage production in 2012,
81 percent was located in the Eastern Norway and 17 percent in Central Norway.
The set of data used in this study is a farm-level unbalanced panel data with 3,885
observations from 455 farms specialized in the production of grain and forage crops during
the period 1991–2013.
5.1 Variables in the model
The outputs in Equation (2) are grain production in kg, adjusted for quality, i.e., feed units (FU)
(y1), forage production in FU (y2) and value of other crop outputs in Norwegian kroner (NOK) (y3).
Grain yield is an aggregate of the four main crops: barley, wheat, oats and oilseeds.
FU is a measure of the physical output adjusted for differences in the quality of outputs.
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1 FU is defined as 1 kg of grain with 15 percent water content. Thus, the output measure is a
quality-adjusted yield of all crops in kilograms per year.
The input prices (wj) in the cost function in Equation (2) are specified as follows: land price
is based on market price for land in terms of rents paid for land at the farm level. The price of
labor is the wage for hired labor.We computed the implicit prices (opportunity costs) of owned
land and family labor based on data for farm-level rents and wages provided by NIBIO. We
included a local wage distribution index (r) to control for regional variation in wages in our
analysis. These data were provided by the Norwegian Tax Administration. The prices of
materials and capital costs were constructed as Laspeyres indices based on figures provided
by NIBIO. Descriptive statistics of the data are shown in Table I.
6. Estimation results and discussion
6.1 Estimation procedures and hypothesis tests
The cost function was estimated using STATA® version 14. The trend variable was
normalized to be zero in the year 2013. We estimated the model for the whole sample.
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Figure 1.
Cropland in hectare
for five regions
of Norway
computed data from
Statistics Norway
Variables Label Unit Eastern region Central region Both regions
TC Total cost NOK 46,016 (30,813) 36,761 (25,183) 43,624 (29,736)
y1 Grain output 1,000 FU 68.44 (69.89) 38.50 (38.61) 60.70 (64.64)
y2 Forage output 1,000 FU 72.96 (53.08) 87.18 (55.87) 76.63 (54.17)
y3 Other outputs 1,000 NOK 9.52 (7.98) 8.73 (6.04) 9.32 (7.54)
w1 Rent NOK /hectare 2,572.60 (159.29) 1,790.60 (122.87) 2,370.50 (154.55)
w2 Wage NOK/hours 141.34 (31.86) 153.56 (30.35) 144.50 (31.93)
w3 Materials price index 66.38 (15.42) 69.51 (15.83) 67.19 (15.59)
w4 Capita price index 80.19 (10.31) 82.33 (10.35) 80.74 (10.36)
r Region index index 0.14 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
Z1 Crop rotation ratio 0.22 (0.07) 0.09 (0.02) 0.20 (0.07)
Z2 Land tenure ratio 0.27 (0.25) 0.24 (0.22) 0.26 (0.24)
Z3 Off-farm activity ratio 0.04 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 0.04 (0.10)
Z4 Gov. support ratio 0.26 (0.11) 0.32 (0.10) 0.28 (0.11)
Year Trend (t) (1 ¼ year 1991)
n Sample size 2,881 1,004 3,885
Note: aStandard deviations in parentheses
Table I.
Descriptive statistics
(mean valuesa)
for crop production
in eastern and
central regions
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The estimated parameters for the translog frontier models are listed in Table VI. Various
specification tests were conducted to obtain the best model and functional form for the data
under analysis. A series of hypotheses about the nature of the frontier model and the
consistency of the cost function with its properties were tested using Likelihood Ratios.
The null hypothesis of an OLS specification was rejected at the 0.01 percent significance
level. Before estimating the cost function, the skewness of the data was tested (Schmidt and
Lin, 1984). The test of skewness returned a p-value of less than 0.001 showing that the null
hypothesis of no skewness was confidently rejected. Therefore, we found support for a
right-skewed error distribution, and hence for the SF specification of the model. We also
tested the characteristics of the technology with the result that a Cobb-Douglas technology
specification was rejected (see Table II). Thus, we estimated a cost function using a translog
function specification.
6.2 Cost efficiency scores
Estimates of CE scores of the farms are presented in Table III. The results show that, at the
means, the minimum costs are about 78 and 81 percent of the actual costs for farms in the
central and eastern regions, respectively. The implication is that average actual cost per
farm could be reduced by 19 to 22 percent. These results are broadly in line with other
studies. Kumbhakar et al. (2014) estimated six different models for the Norwegian grain
farming and reported that the mean technical efficiency varied from 0.64 to 0.91. Odeck
(2007) found a mean technical efficiency for Norwegian grain production of 0.70 for SFA and
0.75 for DEA. Osborne and Trueblood (2006) estimated 70–86 percent inefficiency for
Russian crop production. Our estimate is greater than the estimate by Onyenweaku and
Okoye (2007) of an average CE of 59 percent for cocoyam farmers in Anabra state, Nigeria.
Table III also shows the distribution of the farms in the sample according to their CE.
Thus, 1 percent of the farms are only 60 percent cost efficient while 10 percent of the sample
farms are 71 percent cost efficient. We also checked for differences in the efficiency scores
between the eastern and central regions using a pairwise comparison of the means test.
Restrictions Parametric restrictions Wald test statistics p-value
CD technology H0: all interaction terms are zero 941.57 0.00
Normality test/Test return of Skewness
Schmidt and Lin (1984) 11,850.97 0.00
LR test for random effects 39,235.22 0.00
Table II.
Properties of grain
and forage production
technology
Percentile Eastern region Central region Both regions
1 0.61 0.59 0.60
5 0.69 0.67 0.68
10 0.72 0.70 0.71
25 0.76 0.74 0.76
Mean 0.81 0.78 0.80
75 0.85 0.82 0.84
90 0.90 0.87 0.89
95 0.92 0.90 0.91
99 0.95 0.93 0.95
SD 0.07 0.06 0.07
Observations 2,881 1,004 3,885
Table III.
Cost efficiency scores
for both regions and
the pooled data
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We found the difference to be statically significant (see Table IV ). Our results also showed
that the average inefficiency level was higher, on average, in the years 2000–2013 compared
to the years 1991–2000 (see Table V).
6.3 Elasticities and determinants of cost inefficiency
We checked the robustness of our results by separate estimates for the two regions and
different periods. The regression results in Table VII show that all the first-order terms,
except materials price (w3) and the regional index (r) are significant. The models were found
to exhibit positive and highly significant first-order parameters, fulfilling the monotonicity
condition as expected for a well-behaved cost function. The elasticities of costs of grain,
forage, and other outputs were 0.25, 0.20 and 0.33, respectively. This means, for instance,
that if grain output increases by 1 percent, costs increase by an estimated 0.25 percent,
ceteris paribus. The elasticity of cost of land was 0.02 and significant at the 5 percent level.
If the price of land rose by 1 percent, costs will increase by an estimated 0.02 percent, ceteris
paribus. The elasticity of cost of material inputs was 0.15, but was not statistically
significant. The coefficient for the price of capital (fixed input) (0.83) is the largest among
other partial elasticities and statistically significant (po0.001). This result implies that crop
production in Norway is capital intensive in that the percentage change in the capital price
has a larger influence on the costs of crop production than the costs of other inputs. Thus,
farm managers who want to improve the crop farming needs to give priority to the wise use
of these costs.
The lower part of Table VI presents the coefficients estimated for the determinants
included in the inefficiency effects model. The results indicate that agronomic and
socioeconomic factors influence CE. Farm management practice, specifically crop rotation,
was found to make a positive and significant contribution to reducing the cost of production.
This result is in accord with our expectation, suggesting that crop rotation decreases the
cost of production, probably via a reduction in the use of variable inputs such as fertilizer
and/or by an increase in output for given amounts of input. Thus, our hypothesis is
sustained. Crop rotation can improve the fertility of the soil, interrupt the life cycles of insect
pests and weeds, and can help control soil-borne diseases (Reckling et al., 2015; Vereijken,
1997; Melander et al., 2005). Deike et al. (2008) claimed that crop rotations increase yields to a
higher degree than pesticide intensity and tillage use.
An increase in off-farm activity was found to be associated with a significant reduction
in cost inefficiency (increase in CE) among the farm households. While this result might
seem to be counterintuitive, possible reasons are that off-farm activities broaden farmers’
experience, leading to improved farm management, or off-farm income may relax cash
Group Obs. Mean SD t-value p-value
Central region 1,738 0.903 0.040 70.61 0.000
Eastern region 2,147 0.746 0.085
Table V.
Pairwise comparison of
means of cost efficiency
between 1991–2000
and 2000–2013
Group Obs. Mean SD t-value p-value
Central region 1,004 0.783 0.068 −11.86 0.000
Eastern region 2,881 0.813 0.068
Table IV.
Pairwise comparison of
means of cost efficiency
between eastern and
central regions
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Table VI.
Estimates of
parameters in the
Translog cost function
and inefficiency
determinants
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constraints and allow farmers to spend significantly more on improving farming
technologies (Pfeiffer et al., 2009; Stampini and Davis, 2009). However, our finding is not
consistent with a study of Norwegian grain farms from 1991–2005 which reported that there
was no systematic difference in technical efficiency between part-time and full-time farmers
(Lien et al., 2010). Perhaps the different findings might be explained by our use of a longer
data series, including more recent years, than that available to Lien et al.
The results show that government support has a positive and significant effect on the
efficiency of crop production. Our finding is in line with earlier studies indicating that the
subsidies help the technological development of beneficiary farms. Government support
may give incentives for technological innovation that increase efficiency. In line with our
results, some have claimed that better use of economic resources is achieved (Ferjani, 2008;
Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010). On the other hand, other studies (e.g. Giannakas et al., 2001)
have shown that government payments reduce producer incentives to generate the highest
possible income from farming. Neoclassical economists believe that government support
distorts the allocation of resources, compared to market equilibrium and leads to higher
costs of production. They argue that, in the longer run, subsidies are capitalized into higher
land prices, making it harder for potential progressive new entrants to start farming.
It seems that further study is needed on the specific influence of various government
supports on the efficiency of resource use.
Our results indicate that land tenure also plays an important role in explaining CE
differentials among crop producers. In particular, the greater the proportion of the leased
land, the higher is the CE. One possible reason might be that productive and efficient farms
are spreading the costs of fixed factors such as tractors over larger areas by renting more
land. Deininger and Jin (2009) found that land rental markets can help to move toward a
more economic distribution of operational farm sizes through transfers of land from
producers with low levels of productivity and low comparative advantage in agriculture to
more efficient farmers. Following such transfers, agricultural output and incomes will be
higher for those renting (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).
Although, as noted, crop rotation was found to have positively and significantly
contributed to reducing the cost of production in both regions, the magnitude of
crop rotation contribution in the central region at 0.96 is higher than the 0.29 contribution in
the eastern region (Table VII). Moreover, the importance of crop rotation in the latest
Elasticities
Eastern
(1991–2013)
Central
(1991–2013)
For the year
(1991–2000)
For the year
(2001–2013)
Both regions
(1991–2013)
Grain(y1) 0.26*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.01) 0.30** (0.01) 0.23*** (0.01) 0.25*** (0.01)
Forage(y2) 0.19*** (0.01) 0.21*** (0.02) 0.21*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.01)
Other(y3) 0.31*** (0.01) 0.44*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.02) 0.36*** (0.02) 0.33*** (0.01)
Rent (w2) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01)
Material (w3) 0.09 (0.22) 0.47* (0.27) 0.01 (0.42) 0.55 (0.35) 0.15 (0.18)
Capital (w4) 0.85*** (0.23) 0.58** (0.28) 0.97** (0.42) 0.44 (0.35) 0.83*** (0.19)
Region index (r) 0.01 (0.91) 0.28 (0.52) −0.02 (0.16) 0.31** (0.16) 0.13 (0.11)
Exogenous inefficiency determinates
Crop rotation 0.29*** (0.06) 0.96*** (0.35) 0.19** (0.07) 0.97*** (0.14) 0.31*** (0.06)
Land tenure 0.09*** (0.04) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.16*** (0.04) 0.10*** (0.02)
Off-farm activity 0.37*** (0.02) 0.49*** (0.08) 0.46*** (0.02) 0.43*** (0.02) 0.39*** (0.04)
Government support 0.62*** (0.08) 0.94*** (0.13) 0.32** (0.11) 0.72*** (0.09) 0.65*** (0.07)
Mean cost efficiency 0.81 0.71 0.90 0.75 0.83
Notes: aThe second-order parameters in the TL are dropped, to save space, but are available from the
authors on request. Standard errors in parentheses. *po0.05; **po0.01; ***po0.001
Table VII.
Estimates of
parameters and
determinants of
efficiency by region
and yeara
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farming period, (2001–2013), was higher than in the previous decade (1991–2000). We found
no significant difference between regions, but the contribution of land tenure increased over
time. Perhaps scale economies increased over time with the spread of larger and more
powerful farm machinery. We found no statistical difference in the positive contribution of
off-farm activities between regions or over time. However, the contribution of government
support to CE was higher in the central region (0.94) and increased for the years 2001–2013
(0.72). The reasons for these differences are unclear at present.
7. Conclusion and implication of the study
The aim of this study was to investigate whether farm management and socioeconomic
factors contributed to improving the performance of crop farms in Norway. We found that
farm resources were widely used sub-optimally, i.e., there are farms that produced lower
outputs from the inputs they used or used more inputs to produce the same output,
compared to the best performing farms.
The findings revealed that agronomic and socioeconomic factors affect the cost-efficient
level of crop production. A good agronomic practice – crop rotation – was found to have
made a positive and statically significant contribution to reducing cost. Moreover, the
magnitude of crop rotation contribution was higher in the central region and increased over
time in all regions. Off-farm activity positively and significantly enhanced the performance
of the farms, and farmers renting land are more cost-efficient than those not doing so.
Our analysis also confirms that government support has an association with improved CE,
probably by relaxing farmers’ financial and liquidity constraints, enabling them to purchase
new technologies that can enhance farm crop output. We also found that farmers renting
land is more cost-efficient than those not doing so.
7.1 Implications of the study
One implication for farmers (and their advisers) is that many of them are less efficient than
the estimated benchmark (best performing farms). Thus, those lagging behind the best
performing farms need to look at the way they are operating and to seek out ways to save
costs or increase crop production. Perhaps there are things for lagging farmers to learn from
their more productive farming neighbors. For instance, those farmers not practicing crop
rotation might be well advised to try that practice.
More cost-efficient farms likely to be financially sustainable, and also that more
cost-efficient farms will contribute to the goal of food self-sufficiency. Thus, policymakers
need to help farmers improve their efficiency. This can be done by facilitating the
distribution and sharing of information on good farm management. Since it appears that
farmers’ management is improved with off-farm experience and/or income, it suggests a
need for more focus on the benefits of off-farm work. Policies that promote the development
of non-farm businesses and other employment opportunities in rural areas are therefore
important to enable more farm people to get local jobs. Since subsidies have a positive effect
on efficiency, policymakers should maintain or extend subsidies that help farmers to invest
and innovate. Most Norwegian farms are small and several policy measures are in place that
holds back structural change, making it hard for operators to reap the scale economies we
expect to exist in mechanized crop farming. Policies that limit the transfer of farmland by
sale might be reconsidered if improving CE is considered more important than perpetuating
a traditional farming culture. Policymakers might also usefully seek and implement
measures to facilitate successful farmers sharing their experience with others.
For both taxpayers and consumers, one implication is that the contributions they pay
that go to subsidize farmers appear to bring some benefits in terms of more efficient
production that, in turn, increase the supply of some foods so possibly making food prices
more affordable.
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Researchers need to seek out data to explore further the causes of differences in
efficiency between farms in order to better identify ways of closing the gaps. Our results
show that there is a need to gather more data to be able to identify more farming practices,
besides crop rotation, that lead to more efficient production. Similarly, more studies are
needed to find out what the farmers in the central region do well so that successful practices
might be extended farmer in the eastern region.
It appears that the structure of crop farming in Norway, with a preponderance of
relatively small farms, is likely to be having an adverse effect on efficiency. That effect may
be partially overcome via a healthy rental market. It may well be useful to investigate the
operation of this market to see whether any impediments to land renting exist that might be
removed and whether there are issues about the security of tenure that need to be addressed.
Farmers are getting different types of support from the government and our study
does not account for the different effects of different kinds of subsidy on CE. Different
subsidies might have different effects on farm performance. To get more informative and
useful results, it would be necessary to repeat the analysis with less aggregated data on
subsidy payments.
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